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THE SCOPE OF THE INVENTORY EXCLUSION
UNDER I.R.C. § 1221(1): IS IT A BROAD
EXCLUSION THAT SHOULD BE
NARROWLY CONSTRUED OR A
NARROW EXCLUSION THAT SHOULD BE
BROADLY CONSTRUED OR IS IT
JUST AN ILLUSION?
Patrick E. Hobbs*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult terms to define in the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) is "capital assets."' Indeed, even before the term entered
the tax lexicon in the Revenue Act of 1921,2 Congress struggled in its
attempts to carve out a special category of property that would be enti-
tled to preferential treatment of its gains and subject to certain limita-
tions on its losses.' The reason that capital gains should be treated
differently than gains from noncapital assets is not the subject of this
* Assistant Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 1982, Seton
Hall University; J.D., 1985, University of North Carolina; LL.M., 1988, New York University.
1. See I.R.C. § 1221 (1988).
2. Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
3. See infra part II.A. Currently, for individuals, gains from the sale of capital assets are
taxed at a maximum rate of 28%, whereas the top rate for ordinary income is 31%. See I.R.C.
§ 1 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992). Although a three percent margin may seem insignificant, tell
that to the individual who has just realized a ten million dollar capital gain but does not
qualify for the 28% capital gains rate, thus incurring an additional three hundred thousand
dollars in tax liability. Corporations receive no preference on gains from the sale of capital
assets; instead, recognized corporate income is taxed at a maximum rate of 34%. See id.
§§ 11, 1201 (1988 & West Supp. 1992). Moreover, the major effect of capital asset classifica-
tion for corporate entities is the limitation on the deductibility of losses. Corporations are
allowed to deduct capital losses only to the extent they recognize capital gains. Id. § 1211(a)
(1988). Corporations may, however, carry back unused losses three years and carry them
forward five years to minimize tax liability. Id. § 1212(a) (1988 & West Supp. 1992). The net
effect of these rules for a corporation that incurs substantial capital losses and little or no
capital gains over a period of years is the harsh result of a complete denial of the loss.
This is the quandary faced by most of the corporate taxpayers in the cases discussed in
this Article. Individuals fare a little better because they can use up to three thousand dollars of
unused losses to offset ordinary income each year, and they are allowed to carry over unused
losses indefinitely. Id. §§ 1211(a), 1212(b) (1988). These rules generally put taxpayers in the
position of preferring that their gains be classified as "capital" and their losses "ordinary."
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Article; that debate may never be settled.' Instead, this Article focuses
on how Congress and the judiciary have unsuccessfully attempted to de-
fine the line between capital assets and inventory-the first category of
property excluded from the capital asset class under § 1221 of the Code.'
The term "capital asset" is defined in the Code by exclusion. The
only way to know what qualifies as a capital asset is to know what does
not qualify as a capital asset. In other words, the key to understanding
4. The debate over the tax treatment of capital gains appeared once again in the 1992
presidential election. See Aid for the Rich, Not the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1992, at
A20. The call for a reduction of the tax on capital gains resurrected long-standing, familiar
arguments both in opposition to and in support of such a proposal. Id.
Supporters of a decrease in the current capital gains tax rate argue that the American
economy should be revived with tax-cut incentives to spur new capital investment and to
generate badly needed government revenues. Bush's Need: An Economic Vision, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1992, at E3; see also Donald Lambro, Perils of Clinton's Economic Proposal,
WASH. TIMES, July 23, 1992, at G1 (stating that higher rates, which shrink after-tax return on
capital, is "sure-fire prescription" for driving capital completely out of United States to coun-
tries with emerging economies such as Mexico and India); The Politics and Principle of Capital
Gains, WASH. TIMES, July 30, 1992, at G2 (suggesting that with capital gains tax cut,
"[e]ntrepreneurial activity would suddenly offer the prospect of substantially larger rewards in
compensation for the risks that are always inherent in such undertakings," meaning that inves-
tors could look forward to larger returns on investment because government would be taking
smaller bite out of profit earned). Some avid proponents of decreasing the capital gains tax
argue that prior cuts, such as those enacted in 1978 and 1981, set off the computer revolution
and sparked seven years of uninterrupted growth. Lambro, supra, at Gl; Robert S. McIntyre,
Bad Scholarship, Bad Economics, USA TODAY, June 1, 1992, at 4B.
There are equally strong arguments voiced in opposition to a capital gains tax cut. Oppo-
nents argue that such a tax cut is merely a "reward for the wealthy... [that would] do nothing
to spur investment." Aid for the Rich, Not the Economy, supra, at A20; see also Steve Berg,
Bush Wants to Cut Taxes, but Not Now, BURLINGTON STAR TRIB., Aug. 18, 1992, at 8A
(stating that such relief does not ensure that wealthy Americans will invest their extra wealth
in factories, machinery and equipment); Nancy Mathis, Clinton Lashes Back, Calls Foe a
'Fearmonger', Hous. CHRON., Aug. 22, 1992, at Al (calling capital gains reduction proposal
"cut for the wealthy, the fool's gold of an across-the-board tax cut in the face of a $400 billion
deficit").
Indeed, as both proponents and opponents of a capital gains tax decrease remain firmly
rooted in their arguments, it seems unlikely that the debate over the disparate treatment of
capital assets will be resolved in the near future.
5. See I.R.C. § 1221(1).
6. See id. § 1221, which provides:
[Tihe term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not con-
nected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would prop-
erly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable
year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade
or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memoran-
dum, or similar property, held by-
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the term is to understand the exclusions. There are currently five catego-
ries of property that are excluded from the definition of a capital asset:
(1) inventory or property held for resale; (2) depreciable trade or business
purpose property or real property used in a trade or business; (3) prop-
erty created through a taxpayer's personal efforts, such as a book; (4)
trade or business accounts or notes receivable; and (5) United States gov-
ernment publications.
7
Of these exclusions, only the inventory exclusion was contained in
the original definition of capital assets.8 Significantly, this exclusion sets
out the most basic economic distinction between what is and what is not
a capital asset.9 For example, on a farm the actual land upon which the
crops grow is the capital; the crops that are harvested from the land at
summer's end are the inventory. -Similarly, a mine from which coal is
extracted qualifies as capital, whereas the coal mined is the stock in
trade. Although the words of the inventory exclusion literally capture
this distinction and theoretically draw the requisite bright line between
capital and its produce, its application has proven far more difficult.
Indeed, in 1988 the United States Supreme Court proffered an inter-
pretation of the inventory exclusion that blatantly exceeded the scope of
its intended meaning.1" Epitomizing the impracticability of this ex-
panded definition, a recent Claims Court decision, relying on the
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer for
whom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for
purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or part by refer-
ence to the basis of such property in the hands of a taxpayer described in subpar-
agraph (A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or busi-
ness for services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph (1);
(5) a publication of the United States Govermhent (including the Congressional
Record) which is received from the United States Government or any agency thereof,
other than by purchase at the price at which it is offered for sale to the public, and
which is held by-
(A) a taxpayer who so received such publication, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publication is determined,
for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in part by
reference to the basis of such publication in the hands of a taxpayer described in
subparagraph (A).
Id. (emphasis added).
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
9. See generally LAWRENCE H. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAP-
ITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 25-29 (1951) (discussing development of legal concepts of capital and
income).
10. See Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988) (holding that all stock
held by taxpayer was capital asset because it did not fall within any listed exclusion in I.R.C.
§ 1221). For an in-depth analysis of Arkansas Best, see infra part IV.A.
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Supreme Court's delineation, held that under certain circumstances,
shares of stock held by a taxpayer come within the scope of the inventory
exclusion.11 Should the inventory exclusion be so broadly construed as
to include, under certain circumstances, shares of stock in a corporation?
Alternatively, should it be read so narrowly as to encompass only prop-
erty included in inventory under the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP)?12 Or, as is usually the case, is the answer some-
where in between?
These are the ultimate questions that this Article attempts to an-
swer. Part II begins by briefly tracing the development of the distinction
between "capital assets" and "other property" up to and including the
Revenue Act of 1921, in which the term "capital assets" first appeared in
the Code. 3 This historical review is useful because it both highlights the
difficulties Congress faced in determining what would qualify as a capital
asset and provides insight into the meaning of the current definition.
Parts III and IV examine the judiciary's treatment of the line that Con-
gress drew between inventory and capital assets.1
4
Part III traces the period from the introduction of the term "capital
assets" until the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Arkansas Best
Corp. v. Commissioner.'5 It analyzes how the judiciary, when faced with
factual settings that presumably called for an inventory exclusion analy-
sis, instead relied on the judicial exclusion now known as the Corn Prod-
ucts doctrine. 6 Although the doctrine is now obsolete, many of these
cases remain important because, remarkably, they are now cited as exam-
11. Circle K Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 665, 672 (1991) (citing Arkansas Best Corp.
v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 216 (1988)). For a detailed discussion of the Circle K decision,
see infra part IV.B.
12. The term GAAP refers to the body of professional standards and practices followed by
members of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). See generally
HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDrnNG (John C. Burton et al. eds., 1981) (discussing
accounting profession's efforts to establish GAAP after stock market crash of 1929). These
principles are reflected in the opinions of the Accounting Principles Board, in the statements of
the Financial Accounting Standards Board and in Accounting Research Bulletins. Id. at 40-2
to 40-5.
13. See infra part II.
14. See infra parts III-IV.
15. 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
16. The Corn Products doctrine evolved from the Supreme Court's 1955 landmark deci-
sion in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). The doctrine treats
losses derived from assets integrally related to the taxpayer's business as ordinary. For a de-
tailed discussion of the Corn Products decision, see infra notes 101-35 and accompanying text.
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pies of the scope of the inventory exclusion and are collectively referred
to as the "source of supply" cases.17
Part IV of this Article begins by revisiting the Arkansas Best deci-
sion in which the Supreme Court expressly rejected the existence of a
judicial exclusion and rewrote its earlier decision in Corn Products Refin-
ing Co. v. Commissioner."8 The Court brought about this metamorphosis
by relying on a broad reading of the inventory exclusion. The Court
failed, however, to provide any guidelines or limitations on how broadly
the exclusion should be read, leaving such details to future courts and
Congress. The first court to explore the realm of this broad exclusion
was the Claims Court in Circle K Corp. v. United States,19 which de-
clared the continuing vitality of the "source of supply" doctrine.20 This
part of the Article ends by closely examining that decision and conclud-
ing that although the doctrine may still exist, the Claims Court's descrip-
tion of the doctrine and its holding are erroneous.21
The focus of part V of this Article is an attempt to glean the true
meaning of the words "property of a kind which would properly be in-
cluded in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year" 2 -- the twenty-five words used by the Supreme Court in
determining the scope of the inventory exclusion. 3 A review of the legis-
lative history of the definition of capital assets suggests a far narrower
reading than posited by the Supreme Court in Arkansas Best. Instead, it
would seem that the only property within the ambit of those twenty-five
words is property that is required by a taxpayer's accounting practice to
be included in the calculation of year-end inventory. Although this may
seem to be an unduly restrictive reading of the inventory exclusion-
removing certain types of property from the scope of the exclusion that
had previously been included-it is supported by both the language of
the exclusion24 and the legislative history. 5 Moreover, despite the fact
that an argument can be made that some of these removed assets should
be treated as ordinary in nature, excluding these assets from the capital
assets category is the function of Congress, not the judiciary.
17. See infra notes 138-93 and accompanying text. The source of supply cases generally
involve situations in which the taxpayer purchases a corporation's capital stock to ensure its
inventory needs are met.
18. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
19. 23 Cl. Ct. 665 (1991).
20. Id. at 672; see infra note 225 and accompanying text.
21. See infra part IV.B.
22. I.R.C. § 1221(1).
23. See infra notes 238-54 and accompanying text.
24. See I.R.C. § 1221(1).
25. See infra part V.
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II. DEVELOPING A DEFINITION OF "CAPITAL ASSETS"
4. Pre-Revenue Act of 1921
Congress's struggle to define a class of property that would be af-
forded special treatment started in the early 1860s, when the government
began to use income as a base for generating federal revenue.26 Prior to
this time, monies for the public fisc were derived primarily through tar-
iffs, excise taxes and the sale of public lands.27 The onset of the Civil
War, however, brought about a dire need for increased revenue, and the
federal government decided to meet this need with an "income tax."28
Thereafter, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1862,29 the first income
tax statute to become effective.3" The Revenue Act of 1862 provided for
a tax of five percent upon the "annual gains, profits, or income of every
person residing in the United States, whether derived from any kind of
property, rents, interest, dividends or salaries or from any profession,
trade, employment, or vocation ... or from any source whatever," if
such income exceeded six hundred dollars.31 Although the language of
the Act was broadly worded, it did not specifically state that the term
"income" included gains or profits from the sale of capital assets.32 The
legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1864,13 however, ended all spec-
ulation concerning this issue because it explicitly revealed that the Com-
26. See generally 1 BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrS %% 1.1.1-.2 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing historical establishment of
income tax stemming from Civil War); RoY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FED-
ERAL INCOME TAX 1-8 (1940) (discussing congressional response to fiscal crisis brought on by
Civil War); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 7-15 (1954) (discussing
historical sources taxed and applicable tax rates); SELTZER, supra note 9, at 30-34 (discussing
Civil War tax measures); JOHN F. WrrTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FED-
ERAL INCOME TAX 67-70 (1985) (discussing political pressures in establishing income tax).
27. 1 BrITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 26, at 11 .1.1-.2; BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note
26, at 2-4; PAUL, supra note 26, at 4-7.
28. 1 BrITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 26, at 1I 1.1.1-.2; BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note
26, at 2-4; PAUL, supra note 26, at 7-15.
29. Pub. L. No. 37-97, 12 Stat. 432.
30. Congress had originally drafted the Revenue Act of 1861, which generally provided
for a tax of three percent on income in excess of eight hundred dollars. See H.R. 54, 37th
Cong., 1st Sess. 292-(1861). This never went into effect. See H.R. 312, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 89
(1862); see also SELTZER, supra note 9, at 31 (stating that Revenue Act of 1862 was first tax
measure of Civil War period to become effective).
31. Revenue Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-97, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473.
32. SELTZER, supra note 9, at 31. Although the inclusion of capital gains in income is no
longer questioned, there was genuine doubt as to this issue when the Revenue Act of 1862 was
enacted. Id. This confusion was probably attributable to the British practice of excluding
such gains from income during this period. Id. at 28.
33. Pub. L. No. 38-148, 13 Stat. 223.
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missioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) considered such gains
taxable.34
Two years later, Congress provided the first capital gains relief in
the Revenue Act of 1864.35 When the legislators convened to modify the
1862 Act, members of Congress expressed concern that the gain pro-
duced on the sale of a long-held asset should not be recognized as 100%
income earned in the year of sale because such increase in value had
accrued over time.36 Congress addressed this issue, but in a manner
quite different from today's approach. Rather than resort to the present,
all-encompassing definition of capital assets, Congress instead focused on
one specific type of property that it believed deserved special treatment.37
Furthermore, the relief at stake was not a lower tax through the use of a
preferential rate or deduction, but a complete exemption from taxation.3 s
The 1864 Act exempted from tax all gains on the sale of real property
held for more than one year.39 No explanation was given, however, as to
why such dramatic relief was granted only to real estate; perhaps most
wealth during this period was held in that form. Interestingly, in June of
1864, when Congress amended the 1862 Act, it expressly provided that
all income or gains from the sale of stock or other property, real or per-
sonal, was subject to taxation.'
In subsequently enacted income tax statutes, Congress continued to
manifest its confusion with the distinction between different types of
34. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2516 (1864), reprinted in JACOB S. SEIDMAN,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938-1861, at 1028 (1938); SELT-
ZER, supra note 9, at 31.
35. See § 116, 13 Stat. at 223.
36. SEIDMAN, supra note 34, at 1028. Today, this is referred to as the "bunching effect."
See 1 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 26, 3.5.7, at 3-65 to 3-66; WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 849 (1990).
37. The focus was on real as opposed to personal property. See SEIDMAN, supra note 34,
at 1028.
38. See H.R. 405, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1864).
39. The Act did this by including in taxable income only gains realized from the sale of
real estate held for less than one year. See Revenue Act of 1864 § 116. Specifically, § 116 of
the 1864 Act provided: "[Niet profits realized by sales of real estate purchased within the year
for which income is estimated shall be chargeable as income .... ." Id.
40. Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 281. The 1864 Act is also notable because
it arguably included the first inventory provision. See id. Specifically, § 117 provided:
In estimating the annual gains, profits or income of any person .... the amount of
sugar, wool, butter, cheese, pork, beef, mutton, or other meats, hay, and grain, or
other production of the estate of such person sold, not including any part thereof
unsold. . . , shall be included and assessed as part of the income of such person ....
Id. The sweeping language of the Act effectively included as income all revenues derived from
the sale of products produced by capital, while excluding the taxpayer's ending inventory.
Although this type of provision would seem strange in today's Code, it made sense at the time
of enactment because the economy of the United States was primarily agrarian.
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property warranting preferential treatment. For example, in the Reve-
nue Act of 1867,41 Congress amended the 1864 Act by limiting the provi-
sion exempting gains realized from the sale of real estate to provide relief
only to property held for over two years, instead of one year, as initially
enacted.42 Concomitantly, however, Congress also removed the express
language of the Act that included gains realized from the purchase or
sale of "stocks or other property."43 Thus, congressional attempts to de-
fine a group of capital assets that would be exempt from taxable income
proved less than successful. Moreover, although there would be other
income tax statutes to follow,' it would not be until after the ratification
of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that Con-
gress would attempt to develop an all-encompassing definition of capital
asset.45
41. Ch. 169, 14 Stat. 471.
42. See id. § 13, 14 Stat. at 478-79. It is plausible that the change was brought about by
the need for additional military funding, but the retention of the two-year period in the Reve-
nue Act of 1921 indicates that Congress was attempting to distinguish between a speculator's
return on property, which it considered income, and the appreciation in property over time,
which it considered capital. See H.R. 8245, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921). The following dia-
logue during the Senate debate over the Revenue Act of 1921 is revealing:
Mr. Walsh ....
Under the proposed amendment and bill a lawyer or any other professional man
who derived as a fee from a large case or a merchant who through a substantial
increase in sales derived an income of, say, $100,000 per year is taxable upon the full
amount of income. The speculator who derives an income of $100,000 a year upon
the New York Stock Exchange or in any other manner would be taxable only on 40
per cent of his net income, or $40,000.
If there is any merit at all in the contentions made by those who are in favor of
this amendment it seems to me in all fairness and equity to taxpayers other than
those who are making money in a speculative way upon sudden increases in the value
of property which they hold that there should be a limit in the time allowed for
holding capital assets before the reduced rate of taxation would be applicable ....
Mr. McCumber .... If the Senator would be satisfied with inserting the words
"for more than two years" after the word "investment," in line 24, 1 think that would
meet his suggestion.
61 CONG. REc. 6575-76 (1921) (statements of Sen. Walsh and Sen. McCumber).
43. Revenue Act of 1867 § 13, 14 Stat. at 478; see also Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 63, 66-67 (1872) (holding that gains on sale of government bonds held for approxi-
mately four years were not taxable because increase in value was capital and therefore not
income).
44. See, eg., Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11; Revenue Act of 1870, ch. 255, 16
Stat. 256.
45. The necessity of the Sixteenth Amendment was dictated by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (declaring Revenue Act of
1864 unconstitutional), overruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
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B. Revenue Act of 1921
The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified on February 25, 1913, provided
Congress with the "power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived."46 Accordingly, the Revenue Act of 191341
came into effect eight months later, but without any provisions concern-
ing capital assets.48 In fact, it would be another eight years before the
words "capital assets" would enter the Code.49
The Revenue Act of 1921, drafted in the aftermath of World War I,
stemmed from Congress's desire to reduce the overall tax burden-an
economic move congressional leaders deemed essential to boost the Na-
tion's economy.50 One of the measures in the Act that was intended to
stimulate the economy was a provision designed to relieve the tax burden
on capital gains."1 This provision differed from the Civil War statutes in
two ways. First, Congress did not completely exclude capital gains from
taxable income: It merely provided a lower rate. 2 Second, rather than
addressing specific properties such as real estate, Congress granted relief
to all property coming within the term "capital assets."53 The essence of
the definition was the distinction between property held as capital and
"property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of
46. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.
47. Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
48. See iL
49. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 232.
50. See BLAKEY, supra note 26, at 189-222.
51. See Revenue Act of 1921 § 206, 42 Stat. at 232-33.
52. See id § 206(b). Specifically, gains from the sale of capital assets, at the election of the
taxpayer, could be taxed at 121/2%, provided that the taxpayer did not pay less than 121/%
overall on its total income. Id. The 1921 Act did not contain any limitation on capital losses.
That limitation would not appear until the Revenue Act of 1924. See Revenue Act of 1924,
ch. 234, § 208(c), 43 Stat. 253, 263.
53. See § 206(a) of the Revenue Act of 1921, which provided:
The term "capital assets" as used in this section means property acquired and held by
the taxpayer for profit or investment for more than two years (whether or not con-
nected with his trade or business), but does not include property held for the personal
use or the consumption of the taxpayer or his family, or stock in trade of the tax-
payer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory
of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year.
Revenue Act of 1921 § 206(a). To arrive at such an expansive definition, one would assume
that Congress must have engaged in a long, intellectual dialogue enlisting tax experts and
economists regarding what property should be afforded special treatment and what property
should be exempt from this special treatment. Yet, a review of the legislative history reveals
no such debate. Instead, there appears to have been some sort of telepathic communication of
a definition from time immemorial. The only discussion of the term is by Dr. T.S. Adams,
who testified before the Senate Committee on Finance as the Treasury Department's represen-
tative. See Revenue Act of 1921: Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921) (testimony of Dr. T.S. Adams). When asked what type of
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the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year."'5 4 Interestingly,
the term "inventories" had entered the Code only three years earlier.55
In the Revenue Act of 1918,56 Congress, recognizing the evolution
of the American economy from farms to manufacturing and merchandis-
ing,57 provided:
That whenever in the opinion of the Commissioner the use of
inventories is necessary in order clearly to determine the in-
come of any taxpayer, inventories shall be taken by such tax-
payer upon such basis as the Commissioner, with the Approval
of the Secretary, may prescribe as conforming as nearly as may
be to the best accounting practice in the trade or business and
as most clearly reflecting the income.5 8
Notice two aspects of this provision: (1) Inventories are calculated ac-
cording to rules prescribed by the Commissioner; and (2) in determining
these rules the Commissioner is generally required to adhere to the ac-
counting rules of the particular industry for which the rules are pre-
scribed. 9 In other words, what constitutes "inventory" for tax purposes
is essentially left to the discretion of the Commissioner.
Despite the existence of this inventory provision in the Code, Con-
gress neither cross-referenced the definition of capital assets to it, nor did
Congress specifically grant the Commissioner the authority to prescribe
rules to clearly reflect the character of income." Yet, it is at least argua-
property would receive this special relief, Dr. Adams simply replied, "capital property." Id. at
37.
Additionally, the words "for profit or investment" and the exclusion of property held for
personal use were eliminated in the Revenue Act of 1924. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234,
43 Stat. 253.
54. Revenue Act of 1921 § 206(a)(6) (emphasis added). Of course, the requirement that
property be held for more than two years to qualify as a capital asset also operated as an
exclusion. This use of the holding period in defining what qualified as a capital asset was,
however, eliminated in the Revenue Act of 1934. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117(b),
48 Stat. 680, 714 (codified as amended at LR.C. § 1202 (1988)). Pursuant to the 1934 Act, the
holding period would first be used to determine what level of preference a capital asset would
be accorded, see id. § 117(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222 (1988)), and later to
distinguish between long and short term capital gains and losses, see I.R.C. § 1222 (1988).
55. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 203, 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 471 (1988)).
56. Id.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1918).
58. Revenue Act of 1918 § 203. This provision was the predecessor to today's I.R.C.
§ 471 (1988). Moreover, the language cited above is almost identical to the current version.
Compare Revenue Act of 1918 § 203 with I.R.C. § 471 (1988).
59. See Revenue Act of 1918 § 203.
60. The term "character" refers to the type of income or gain received by the taxpayer
such as ordinary, capital or tax exempt. See Revenue Act of 1921 § 206(a)(6).
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ble that by defining the inventory exclusion as it did, Congress implicitly
granted such authority to the Commissioner. Taking this statement to
its logical conclusion, if the Commissioner had such authority, then pre-
sumably the rules developed by the Commissioner to determine what
property may be included in "inventory" would also apply for purposes
of determining what property comes within the scope of the exclusion.
And just as the Commissioner has the authority to disregard the ac-
counting practice utilized to clearly reflect income, he or she could also
ignore the accounting practice employed to clearly reflect character-
subject, of course, to ultimate review by the judiciary. 1
III. THE JUDICIARY IGNORES THE INVENTORY EXCLUSION
A. From General Counsel Memorandum 17,322 to Corn Products
In 1936 the Commissioner issued General Counsel Memorandum
17,322.62 The effect of this memorandum on the judicial treatment of the
definition of capital assets cannot be overstated. Moreover, the memo-
randum could easily have been read as an attempt by the Commissioner
to exercise the authority outlined above.6 3 But the courts, beginning
with the Tax Court decision of Ben Grote v. Commissioner," would cite
this memorandum for a much broader proposition, making it the founda-
tion upon which the now rejected judicial exclusion to the definition of
capital assets was built. 5
The issue raised in General Counsel Memorandum 17,322 was
whether losses incurred by a textile manufacturer in the cotton futures
market,6 6 entered in order to protect the manufacturer from fluctuations
in the price of cotton, were capital or ordinary in nature.67 The impor-
61. See I.R.C. § 471.
62. Gen. Couns. Mem. 17,322 (1936), in 15-2 C.B. 151 (1936). This memorandum was
restated in part and superseded by Rev. Rul. 72-179, 1972-1 C.B. 57.
63. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
64. 41 B.T.A. 247 (1940).
65. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955); Trenton Cotton Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1945); Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Commis-
sioner, 22 T.C. 1044, 1051 (1954); Estate of Makransky v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 397, 412
(1945), aff'd per curiam, 154 F.2d 59 (3rd Cir. 1946); Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 1942 T.C.M. (P-H) 295, 295-96, aff'd per curiam, 130 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.
1942); Ben Grote, 41 B.T.A. at 249.
66. A futures contract is a standardized contract to purchase (long position) or sell (short
position), at a fixed price, a specified amount of a commodity-such as cotton, corn or orange
juice-at a fixed date in the future. Edward D. Kleinbard & Suzanne F. Greenberg, Business
Hedges After Arkansas Best, 43 TAX L. Rav. 393, 394 n.3 (1988). Such contracts are entered
into on an exchange that operates to match long and short positions. Id.
67. Gen. Couns. Mem. 17,322, supra note 62, at 151. Cotton was the textile manufac-
turer's raw material. See id. at 152.
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tance of this memorandum was not its holding that the losses incurred on
the taxpayer's nonspeculative futures transactions were ordinary. 68 The
significance of this memorandum was how the Commissioner arrived at
this conclusion. Did the Commissioner clearly state that there are addi-
tional exclusions to the definition of capital assets or did the memoran-
dum, taken as a whole, more easily fit within an inventory exclusion
analysis? The reason for the mystery is the absence of authority used by
the Commissioner to support his ultimate conclusion.
The Commissioner began his analysis by classifying a taxpayer's ef-
forts to protect itself against price instability as "hedging transactions.
' '69
The Commissioner then identified two typical situations in which such
hedges are necessary: (1) to protect against cotton price increases; and
(2) to protect against cotton price decreases.70 The Commissioner la-
beled these transactions "hedges" because they "tend to assure ordinary
operating profits, are common trade practices and are generally regarded
as a form of insurance."'" In other words, by eliminating the risk of
inventory price fluctuation, the taxpayer would realize the expected re-
turn on the sale of the commodity.
The main discussion of General Counsel Memorandum 17,322 fo-
cused on accounting methods, comparing the inventory accounting
method of the textile manufacturer to the inventory accounting method
of the cotton dealer.72 But before arriving at that analysis, the Commis-
68. Id at 155.
69. Id at 152.
70. Id. The Commissioner described the taxpayer's procedure for insuring against such
risks as follows:
(1) The taxpayer buys quantities of spot cotton, which will necessarily be on
hand for some months before being manufactured into goods and sold. In order to
be protected against losses which would be incurred if the cotton market declined
during those months, the taxpayer, at the same time the above purchases are made,
enters into futures sale contracts for the delivery of equivalent amounts of cotton a
few months hence. As the above quantities of spot cotton are subsequently disposed
of by sales from time to time of manufactured cotton goods, the above futures sale
contracts are concurrently disposed of by futures purchase contracts which serve as
offsetting transactions closing out the futures sale contracts.
(2) The taxpayer makes contracts for future delivery of cotton goods, the manu-
facture of which will require more cotton than the amount on hand or the amount
which can be immediately purchased advantageously. In order to secure protection
against a rising cotton market during the months that intervene between the date of
the order for cotton goods and the agreed delivery date, the taxpayer, at the same
time the above orders are taken, enters into futures purchase contracts for cotton in
amounts necessary to provide the desired protection. As the taxpayer from time to
time buys spot cotton for the manufacture of the goods specified in the above orders,
the futures purchase contracts are disposed of by futures sale contracts which serve
as offsetting transactions closing out the futures purchase contracts.
Id
71. Id
72. Id at 153-55.
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sioner used words that soon became the basis of the nonstatutory exclu-
sion to the definition of capital assets, otherwise known as the Corn
Products doctrine.7 3 The Commissioner asserted:
Where futures contracts are entered into only to insure against
the above-mentioned risks inherent in the taxpayer's business,
the hedging operations should be recognized as a legitimate
form of business insurance. As such, the cost thereof, which
includes losses sustained therein, is an ordinary and necessary
expense deductible under [the predecessor to I.R.C. § 162]. 74
73. See generally Jesse V. Boyles, The Supreme Court Kills the Corn Products Doctrine-
But Will It Rest in Peace, 66 TAXES 723 (1988) (discussing impact of Arkansas Best decision
on Corn Products doctrine and arguing that Corn Products is still viable in federal tax law);
Virginia L. Briggs & H. Ward Classen, Arkansas Best: A Return to the Reasoning of Corn
Products, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1229 (1987) (arguing that Arkansas Best decision clarifies
ambiguity in Corn Products doctrine by treating purchase of stock of one corporation by an-
other corporation as capital asset); Virginia L. Briggs & H. Ward Classen, Corn Products and
Its Progeny: Where Do We Go From Here?, 66 TAXES 74 (1988) (arguing that Arkansas Best
rejects reasoning found in Corn Products progeny and instead adopts narrow holding of its
prior decision in Corn Products); Kleinbard & Greenberg, supra note 66, at 405-14 (discussing
application of Corn Products doctrine in subsequent cases); Allen J. Littman, Ordinary Losses
on Sales of Stock Is Circle K an Unwarranted Expansion of Arkansas Best?, 32 TAx MGMT.
MEMORANDUM 343 (1991) (stating that close connection test in Circle K substantially ex-
pands Corn Products doctrine); Edward J. Schnee & Michael L. Roberts, The Arkansas Best
Decision, 19 TAx ADVISER 813 (1988) (examining Arkansas Best decision that capital stock
may not qualify for ordinary loss treatment and analyzing this decision's effect on Corn Prod-
ucts doctrine); D. Chase Troxell & Roger Noall, Judicial Erosion of the Concept of Securities as
Capital Assets, 19 TAx L. REv. 185 (1964) (arguing that Supreme Court eroded traditional
concept of capital assets and that Supreme Court should clarify distinction between business-
connected and non-business-connected purchases of securities); Lar G. Gustafsson, Com-
ment, A Holding Company's Stock in a Subsidiary: A Capital or Ordinary Asset?, 65 TEx. L.
REv. 1029 (1987) (arguing that clear and workable test must be formulated to determine
whether holding company's ownership of subsidiary's stock should be deemed capital or ordi-
nary asset and advocating employment of simple registration method to ensure equitable appli-
cation of tax laws); Deborah F. Marson, Note, The Impact of Corn Products: Twenty-Three
Years Later, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 869 (1978) (arguing that Congress should enact addi-
tional exception to I.R.C. § 1221, which should give capital status to nondepreciable business
property other than land); Michael E. Mermall, Comment, Revitalizing the Corn Products
Doctrine, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 217 (1986) (proposing business risk test to enable courts to define
scope of Corn Products doctrine in accord with congressional intent); Maria E. O'Neill, Note,
Arkansas Best Corporation v. Commissioner-The Demise of the Corn Products Doctrine, 35
WAYNE L. REv. 1481 (1989) (arguing Arkansas Best decision restricts Corn Products doctrine
by eliminating intent factor in capital asset determination); Paul W. Reichel, Note, When is
Capital Stock Not a Capital Asset? Definition of a Capital Asset after Arkansas Best Corp. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 831, 833 (1990) (analyzing Arkan-
sas Best's interpretation of Corn Products and concluding that "ordinary income treatment for
capital stock transactions is no longer appropriate in the source of income and business reputa-
tion cases").
74. Gen. Couns. Mem. 17,322, supra note 62, at 152.
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Taken alone, this language indicates that the Commissioner felt uncon-
strained by the statutory definition of capital assets. If that is all General
Counsel Memorandum 17,322 contained, then the subsequent use of this
language by courts to support a judicial exclusion would be understanda-
ble.7" The above-quoted passage, however, was contained in one intro-
ductory paragraph.76 The focus of the remainder of General Counsel
Memorandum 17,322 was not on forms of business insurance; instead, it
focused on inventory accounting methods.7 7
Moreover, the precise issue addressed in General Counsel Memo-
randum 17,322 was whether a different accounting method alone should
determine the character of the gain or loss realized for different accrual-
method78 taxpayers holding similar property for a similar purpose.7 9 In
analyzing this question, the Commissioner began by reviewing the inven-
tory accounting method of a cotton dealer.8 0 The Commissioner stated
that the accounting practice of the cotton dealer-considered the best for
clearly reflecting income-required that the taxpayer use the mark-to-
market method of reporting inventory.81 The Commissioner then ex-
plained that this method required the taxpayer to include in its inventory
75. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955) (reading General
Counsel Memorandum 17,322 to hold that "hedging transactions were essentially to be re-
garded as insurance rather than a dealing in capital assets"); Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner, 147 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1945) ("Purchases and sales against price fluctuations are
insurance against loss and such transactions have a direct relationship to profit realized or loss
sustained in the conduct of a business."); Commissioner v. Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co.,
120 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir.) ("A hedge is a form of price insurance; it is resorted to by busi-
nessmen to avoid the risk of changes in the market price of a commodity."), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 683 (1941); Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1044, 1053 (1954)
("[Tihe ftitures transactions entered into by petitioner during the fiscal years were true hedging
operations to insure it against the risks of the cotton market."); Estate of Makransky v. Com-
missioner, 5 T.C. 397, 412 (1945) ("It has long been the practice of the Commissioner and the
courts to treat losses from hedging transactions as essentially insurance and deductible as ordi-
nary and necessary business expense rather than losses from dealings in capital assets."), aff'd
per curiam, 154 F.2d 59 (3rd Cir. 1946).
76. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 17,322, supra note 62, at 152.
77. See id. at 153-55.
78. Under the accrual method,
income is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred which
fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with
reasonable accuracy. Under such a method, deductions are allowable for the taxable
year in which all the events have occurred which establish the fact of the liability
giving rise to such deduction and the amount thereof can be determined with reason-
able accuracy.
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (1960).
79. Gen. Couns. Mem. 17,322, supra note 62, at 154.
80. Id. at 153.
81. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 1256 (1988) (inventories held by taxpayer at close of taxable year
are treated as if sold for fair market value on last business day of such taxable year, with gain
or loss taken into account for that tax year).
INVENTORY EXCLUSION
calculation any open hedges that were not held for speculation. 2 As a
result, the taxpayer indirectly reported these unrealized gains and losses
as ordinary income or loss in its year-end inventory. Thus, the inventory
accounting method of the cotton dealer provided that futures contracts,
held for nonspeculative purposes, were property "of a type properly in-
cludable in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the tax
year."83 Presumably then, even if these futures contracts were closed out
before year end, because they were a type of property includable in inven-
tory, the gain or loss recognized would be classified as ordinary, not
capital.
The Commissioner then turned to the textile manufacturer. 84 The
Commissioner explained that, unlike the cotton dealer, the textile manu-
facturer did not take into account unrealized gains and losses from fu-
tures transactions in its year-end inventory. Instead, good accounting
practice required that such gains and losses be reported in the year that
the futures contract was closed out." Implicitly then, the Commissioner
was being asked whether the gain or loss produced by these hedges was
capital in nature simply because the textile manufacturer used a different
accounting method than the cotton dealer, even though both taxpayers
used the hedges for the same purpose: to protect against inventory price
fluctuation. In this context at least, the Commissioner stated that re-
gardless of the accounting or inventory methods employed, futures con-
tracts held to protect against fluctuations in the price of inventory are not
capital assets.
86
The judiciary could have interpreted General Counsel Memoran-
dum 17,322 in one of two ways. It could have concluded that this was a
situation in which the Commissioner, in attempting to determine what
was within the scope of the inventory exclusion, decided to ignore the
inventory accounting method employed by the taxpayer because the
hedges were part of the inventory system developed by the taxpayer. Al-
ternatively, the judiciary could have found that General Counsel Memo-
randum 17,322 had nothing to do with inventory, and instead clearly
stated that the statutory exclusions to the definition of capital assets are
merely illustrative and not exhaustive. Remarkably, the courts steadily
adopted the latter interpretation over the next fifty years. 7
82. Gen. Couns. Mer. 17,322, supra note 62, at 153.
83. I.R.C. § 1221(1) (1988).
84. Gen. Couns. Meii. 17,322, supra note 62, at 154.
85. Id.
86. Id at 155.
87. See supra note 75.
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The first court to adopt this approach was the Board of Tax Ap-
peals8" in Ben Grote v. Commissioner.89 Ben Grote involved wheat farm-
ers who actively bought and sold wheat futures.90 In 1935 the taxpayers
incurred losses in their wheat futures trading, which they presumably
took as an ordinary deduction on their federal income tax return.91 Ap-
parently, the Commissioner disallowed the deduction, claiming that they
were losses from the sale of capital assets and could only be offset against
capital gains.92 As part of the court's findings of fact, it determined that
the farmers invested in wheat futures to protect themselves against a fluc-
tuation in the price of wheat.93 Based on this fact alone, the court, citing
General Counsel Memorandum 17,322, found that the gains and losses
resulting from the taxpayers' futures transactions were not capital in na-
ture.94 Unlike the Commissioner in General Counsel Memorandum
17,322, however, the court was not compelled to inquire into the inven-
tory accounting methods employed by the taxpayer-a finding of non-
speculative hedging was enough to assure ordinary loss treatment.95
With the Ben Grote decision paving the way, it would be seventeen
years before a court would engage in an inventory exclusion analysis
when dealing with hedging transactions. 6 Indeed, rather than develop a
set of rules to determine what effect a taxpayer's inventory accounting
method should have in determining the character of the realized gain or
loss on the sale of property, or how broadly the phrase "property of a
type includable in inventory"9 should be read, courts instead focused on
various aspects of a taxpayer's hedging transactions.98 For example, if
88. The Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336, established the
Board of Tax Appeals. The Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957
(codified at I.R.C. § 7441 (1988)), changed its name to the Tax Court of the United States.
89. 41 B.T.A. 247 (1940).
90. Id. at 248.
91. The brevity of the opinion requires several procedural assumptions. See id.
92. !d at 249.
93. Id. at 247.
94. Id. at 249 (citing General Counsel Memorandum 17,322 (1936), in 15-2 C.B. 151
(1936)).
95. Id. Although the Board did take note of the fact that the taxpayers used inventories in
keeping their books, its only concern with this fact was addressing the issue of whether wheat
covered by a futures contract should be included in inventory. See id. The court then stated
that it did not know the answer to this question, but that it was irrelevant because the taxpay-
ers had no inventory of any kind on hand at the end of the taxable year. Id. at 248-49.
96. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350
U.S. 46 (1955).
97. I.R.C. § 1221 (1988).
98. See, e.g., Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33, 37 (6th Cir. 1945)
(holding that cottonseed oil producing corporation's purchase of cottonseed oil futures consti-
tuted capital loss because purchases were not made to protect corporation against loss); Fulton
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the transaction at issue fit within the court's notion of a "non-speculative
hedge," the gains and losses realized were treated as ordinary; if not, they
were characterized as capital.99 In making this determination, courts
concentrated on, among other things, the timing of the hedge, the quan-
tity of commodity hedged and the type of property used to hedge.l"o It
was not until the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner °1' that a court
would return to an examination of the scope of the inventory exclusion in
this context.1
0 2
As its name suggests, the taxpayer in Corn Products was involved in
the manufacture and sale of corn-based products.0 3 The taxpayer's busi-
ness required large amounts of corn, yet the corn had a maximum stor-
age durational capacity of less than three weeks."° The sales policy of
the taxpayer generally provided that a shipment of goods would be sold
at the lower of the contract price or the market price on the date of
delivery. 10 5 Consequently, the taxpayer's profit margins were left ex-
posed during periods of rising corn prices, which were most often the
Bag & Cotton Mills v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1044, 1052-53 (1954) (holding that losses in-
curred in cotton futures constituted hedging transaction because contracts related directly to
manufacturing business); Stewart Silk Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 174, 177 (1947) (holding
that transactions in silk futures for purpose of protecting inventory against competition with
synthetic fabric companies were hedges); Estate of Makransky v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 397,
413 (1945) (finding that cottonseed oil dealer's purchases of refined oil futures to make up for
insufficient crude oil facilities were not hedges because dealer merely switched market risk
from crude to refined oil), aff'dper curiam, 154 F.2d 59 (3rd Cir. 1946); Tennessee Egg Co. v.
Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 558, 560 (1942) (holding that futures purchases are not hedges when
there is no counterbalancing sales transaction); Battelle v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 117, 125
(1942); (holding that futures purchases of crops to be delivered before offsetting crops were
planted were not hedges); Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 1942 T.C.M.
(P-H) 295, 296 (holding that taxpayer, who was manufacturer of crude cottonseed oil, could
not include futures for refined cottonseed oil in inventory, when taxpayer did not deal in re-
fined cottonseed oil), aff'd per curiam, 130 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1942). For an excellent discus-
sion of the early judicial treatment of hedging transactions, see Clifford H. Rich & Benjamin
N. Rippe, Tax Aspects of Commodity Futures Transactions With a Business Purpose, 2 TAx L.
RFv. 541 (1947).
99. Rich & Rippe, supra note 98, at 548.
100. Id.
101. 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
102. Id. at 515-16. Three separate Tax Court opinions were consolidated on appeal to the
Second Circuit. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 503 (1953), aff'd, 215 F.2d
513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 11
T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (1952), aff'd, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Corn
Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395 (1951), aff'd, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954),
aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
103. Corn Products, 215 F.2d at 514. Specifically, the taxpayer manufactured sugars,
starches, oils and feeds. Id
104. Id
105. Id. at 515.
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result of droughts. 10 6 In an effort to avoid the harsh results of escalating
prices, the taxpayer began to establish a long position in corn futures, 07
believing this to be a more economical method of maintaining a reason-
ably priced supply of corn than building additional storage facilities.108
The results of the taxpayer's investment in the corn futures were not
included in the taxpayer's inventory; instead, the profits and losses were
shown in an account entitled "Corn Miscellaneous"-an account used to
determine the cost of goods sold."° In 1940 the taxpayer made substan-
tial profits on its investment in the corn futures, posted them in the Corn
Miscellaneous account, and included them in its calculation of cost of
goods sold.' 1 While litigating a separate matter in the Tax Court, how-
ever, the taxpayer sought to have these profits treated separately as gains
from the sale of capital assets."'
The Tax Court addressed this issue by employing the hedge exami-
nation framework that evolved from Ben Grote."2 Finding that the tax-
payer's investments in corn futures were subject to ordinary treatment,
the Tax Court stated:
[A]lthough perhaps not conforming technically to the defini-
tion of a hedge, it seems indisputable as our findings show that
petitioner's practice of purchasing corn futures was an integral
part of its manufacturing. It would hence be anomalous to
view them as purely speculative transactions of a capital nature,
. . . and the burden here is on petitioner to show that it
incorrectly treated the losses as ordinary on its original tax
returns. 1
3
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the taxpayer presented alternative
arguments." 4 The taxpayer first maintained that none of the exclusions
under § 117 of the Code-the predecessor to § 1221-applied, and that
the judicially created exception regarding hedging transactions was not
106. See idl
107. See supra note 66 for a definition of a long position corn future.
108. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 48 (1955).
109. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 721, 723 (1952), aff'd, 215
F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
110. Corn Products, 215 F.2d at 515.
111. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395, 398 (1953), aff'd, 215 F.2d 513
(2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
112. See Corn Products, I1 T.C.M. (CCH) at 726 (citing Estate of Makransky v. Commis-
sioner, 5 T.C. 397 (1945), aff'd per curtam, 154 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1946); Tennessee Egg Co. v.
Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 558 (1942); Battelle v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 117 (1942); Ben
Grote v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 247 (1940)). See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Ben Grote.
113. Corn Products, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) at 726 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
114. Corn Products, 215 F.2d at 515.
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supported by the statute.115 In the alternative, the taxpayer argued that
if the court adhered to the notion of the existence of a hedge exception,
then the taxpayer's gains were still capital in character because the tax-
payer's actions did not amount to true hedging within the meaning of the
exception. 116
Expressly rejecting the existence of a nonstatutory or a judicially
created exception to the definition of a capital asset, the Second Circuit
found that these transactions fit within the inventory exclusion because
they were part of the taxpayer's inventory purchase system. 17 In so
holding, the court stated:
In the hedge,... the property is used in such a manner as to
come within the exclusions, for it is a part of the inventory
purchase system which is utilized solely for the purpose of sta-
bilizing inventory cost. It is an integral part of the productive
process in which the property is held not for investment but for
the protection of profit with the intent of disposition when that
purpose has been achieved. As such it cannot reasonably be
separated from the inventory items and the cost (or profit) from
such operations would necessarily be entered in the books of
account of the business as part of cost of goods sold. The tax
treatment of hedges, then, is not a "judge made exception" to
Section 117(a); it is simply a recognition by the courts that
property used in hedging transactions properly comes within
the exclusions of the section.
118
Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the gains were to be given
ordinary treatment. 19
As evidenced by the above quoted passage, the Second Circuit fo-
cused on the taxpayer's motive for holding the property rather than the
type of property the taxpayer held.120 Furthermore, like the Commis-
sioner in General Counsel Memorandum 17,322, the circuit court re-
ferred to the transaction as an effort by the taxpayer to insure against
price fluctuation. 21 But unlike General Counsel Memorandum 17,322,
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id at 516.
118. Id
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Id; see Gen. Couns. Mem. 17,322, supra note 62, at 152. In dismissing any need to
concern itself with whether this was true hedging, the court borrowed the insurance analogy
from General Counsel Memorandum 17,322, stating that "[f]utures contracts were entered
into to stabilize inventory costs and thus protect profit, and whether complete or only partial
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the Second Circuit made clear that gains and losses resulting from this
insurance activity were within the scope of the inventory exclusion and
not a separate exclusion for hedges.122 Moreover, although it had been
over a decade since the issuance of General Counsel Memorandum
17,322 and the Board of Tax Appeal's decision in Ben Grote, the circuit
court's opinion in Corn Products unequivocally replaced the deeply en-
trenched reasoning that had been consistently used to analyze the tax
consequences of a taxpayer's dealings in futures contracts with an inven-
tory exclusion analysis.' 23 In doing so, however, the Second Circuit
failed to discuss how the taxpayer's investment in the futures contracts
came within the actual language of the exclusion.124 Instead, the court
was satisfied that the futures activities of the taxpayer in Corn Products
were part of the taxpayer's inventory purchase system. 125 This return to
inventory exclusion analysis would be short-lived because in affirming
the circuit court's decision, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case without resorting to a strict statutory analysis. 26
The Supreme Court took a much more philosophical approach to
resolving the case. Indeed, rather than concern itself with aspects of
hedges and specific exclusions, the Court pondered the true meaning of
the term "capital assets."' 27 Writing for a unanimous Court, 128 Justice
Clark declared that Congress "intended that profits and losses arising
from the everyday operation of a business be considered as ordinary in-
come or loss rather than capital gain or loss."' 129 Moreover, Justice
Clark characterized the taxpayer as a "far-sighted manufacturer" whose
business transactions were designed to protect its manufacturing opera-
tions against an increase in the price of its principal raw material and to
assure a ready supply for future manufacturing requirements.13 0 Unfor-
tunately, just as it was difficult to decipher the rationale behind the issu-
ance of General Counsel Memorandum 17,322,131 it was unclear what
insurance was thereby obtained is simply a difference in degree, not in kind." Corn Products,
215 F.2d at 516.
122. Corn Products, 215 F.2d at 516.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id The court neglected to state how it would define "inventory purchase system" for
other taxpayers in the future. See id. The same failing would occur 33 years later in Arkansas
Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
126. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
127. Id at 52. The Court stated that the definition "must not be so broadly applied as to
defeat rather than further the purpose of Congress." Id.
128. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 54.
129. Id at 52.
130. Id at 51.
131. See supra notes 66-87 and accompanying text.
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rule the Supreme Court was adopting in Corn Products. Over three de-
cades later, in Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner,132 the Supreme
Court would claim that it had engaged in an inventory exclusion analy-
sis. 133 But, during that thirty-three year period, taxpayers felt that as
long as they could show that a loss was derived from the sale of an asset
that was integrally related to its business, the character of that loss would
be characterized as ordinary. This approach became known as the Corn
Products doctrine or the "business purpose" test. 134 Significantly, many
of the cases employing the doctrine would have nothing to do with
inventory.1
35
Even though taxpayers no longer found it necessary to demonstrate
a nexus between the asset being disposed of and inventory, a line of cases
decided during the Corn Products doctrine's reign did; these cases are
commonly referred to as the source of supply cases. 136 Like the taxpayer
in Corn Products, these cases involve efforts by taxpayers to assure a
ready supply of inventory. The one great difference in these cases is that
the property used by the taxpayers to guarantee this supply was not a
futures contract, it was the capital stock of another corporation-prop-
erty that is often thought of as the quintessential capital asset.' 37
B. The Source of Supply Doctrine Develops
In a typical source of supply fact pattern, a taxpayer purchases a
corporation's capital stock to assure an ample supply of that corpora-
tion's products, enabling the taxpayer to meet its future inventory
needs.' 38 To treat such stock as a capital asset, however, creates an ad-
132. 485 U.S. 212 (1988). For a detailed discussion of the Arkansas Best decision, see infra
part IV.A.
133. Id. at 220.
134. See supra note 73.
135. See, eg., Campbell Taggart, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1984) (to
protect its reputation as business acquirer, holding company purchased stock in supermarket
chain); Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.) (attorney purchased stock in em-
ployer to protect his position as general counsel), cert denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); Hagan v.
United States, 221 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Ark. 1963) (salesman purchased stock in client in order
to ensure continuing sales of products); Southeastern Aviation Underwriters v. Commissioner,
25 T.C.M. (CCH) 412 (1966) (agency purchased stock in insurance company to obtain man-
agement contract).
136. See infra part III.B.
137. See Agway, Inc. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1194, 1200 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
138. See, e.g., FS Servs., Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (wholesaler
purchased stock in refinery to maintain ample supply of petroleum products); Booth News-
papers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (newsprint case); Journal Co. v.
United States, 195 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Wis. 1961) (publisher purchased stock in paper mill to
maintain ample supply of newsprint); Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605
(E.D. Va. 1958) (retailer purchased stock in supplier's corporation to maintain ample supply of
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ministrative nightmare. Specifically, if the taxpayer sells securities at a
loss, the taxpayer can claim the securities were held for the business pur-
pose of guaranteeing a source of supply and, therefore, should not be
characterized as capital assets. On the other hand, few taxpayers could
resist disavowing this business purpose if a disposition results in a gain,
and if such gains would then be taxed at favorable capital gains rates.
The question of how to treat such securities actually began with the
Tax Court's decision in Logan & Kanawha Coal Co. v. Commissioner,
139
ten years before the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Corn Products
Refining Co. v. Commissioner." Logan involved a taxpayer who was in
the business of selling coal of various sizes and grades to customers
throughout the United States.14 In order to "maintain a favorable rela-
tion" with certain suppliers, the taxpayer would sometimes acquire
shares of stock in their companies.' 42 In 1937 one of the taxpayer's sup-
pliers, Standard Banner Coal Co. (Standard), promised to supply the tax-
payer with the entire output of the company, provided that the taxpayer
purchase the thirty percent interest of a disgruntled stockholder.'43 The
taxpayer purchased the shares, and within four years Standard was in
receivership.'" Thereafter, the taxpayer sold the stock at a substantial
loss, which it took as an ordinary deduction on its federal income tax
return.
45
ladies' suits); Hogg v. Allen, 105 F. Supp. 12 (M.D. Ga. 1952) (retailer purchased stock in
distilling company to maintain ample supply of whiskey), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Edwards v. Hogg, 214 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1954); Livesley v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH)
133 (1963) (distributor purchased stock in potato company to maintain ample supply of pota-
toes); Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1026 (1960) (manufacturer
purchased stock in foundry to maintain ample supply of electrical castings); Tulane Hardwood
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1146 (1955) (lumber wholesaler purchased debentures
in plywood manufacturer to maintain ample supply of plywood); Flom v. Hofferbert, 56-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9236 (D. Md. 1955) (whiskey case); McGhee Upholstery Co. v. Com-
missioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCII) 1455 (1953) (furniture manufacturer purchased stock in spring
manufacturer's company to maintain ample supply of furniture springs); Clark v. Commis-
sioner, 19 T.C. 48 (1952) (whiskey case); Western Wine & Liquor Co. v. Commissioner, 18
T.C. 1090 (1952) (whiskey case); Wm. M. Young Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 863
(1952) (lumber case); Hoffman Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 579 (1952)
(retailer purchased stock in lumber manufacturer to maintain ample supply of lumber); Logan
& Kanawha Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1298 (1945) (coal retailer purchased stock in
wholesaler's business to maintain ample supply of coal). See generally Troxell & Noall, supra
note 73, at 192-204 (discussing concept of securities as capital assets).
139. 5 T.C. 1298 (1945).
140. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
141. Logan, 5 T.C. at 1299.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1300.
144. Id
145. Id
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Upon the Commissioner's denial of the ordinary loss, the taxpayer
petitioned the Tax Court.146 Even though the facts clearly demonstrated
that the taxpayer had invested in the stock to gain access to Standard's
output of coal, the Tax Court-adopting a literal interpretation of the
definition of capital assets-concluded that the stock qualified as a capi-
tal asset. 147 The Tax Court focused solely on the form of the property,
dismissing as irrelevant the taxpayer's business motive in holding the
property.1 48 Logan was the last decision to adopt such a literal approach
in defining capital assets when dealing with a source of supply scenario.
Later courts would consider evidence of the taxpayer's motive to be
paramount. 149
Courts frequently grappled with taxpayers' motives for acquiring
stock during World War II, when many goods were in short supply and
the Office of Price Administration set price ceilings on thousands of
items.150 In order to circumvent their adherence to these ceilings, suppli-
ers would often require purchasers to acquire the supplier's stock, either
at an inflated price,151 or subject to the supplier's option to repurchase
146. Id
147. Id. The taxpayer argued that the purchase of the shares of stock was similar to a
hedging transaction and therefore entitled to special treatment. Id at 1303. In contrast, the
Tax Court listed the exclusions under § 117 of the Code and ruled that none were applicable.
Id. This provision, now codified in I.R.C. § 1221, defined capital assets as follows:
iTihe term "capital assets" means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not
connected with his trade or business), but does not include stock in trade of the
taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inven-
tory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business,... [or] property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property
used in his trade or business.
Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 117(a)(1), 52 Stat. 447, 500 (codified at I.R.C. § 1221(l)-(2)
(1988)).
148. Logan, 5 T.C. at 1304.
149. See, e.g., FS Servs., Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 548, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (deciding
that taxpayer's acquisition of stock was based upon proper and valid business considerations
rather than intent to make capital investment); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303
F.2d 916, 921 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (holding that taxpayer's motivation in purchasing securities may
determine treatment under I.R.C.); Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1026,
1031 (1960) (holding that "the tax treatment of the loss on the sale of... stock depends upon
the purpose for which the petitioner acquired the stock").
150. Exec. Order No. 8734, 3 C.F.R. 921 (1938-1943). The Office of Price Administration
(OPA) was created shortly before the United States entered World War II to prevent undue
price increases and to provide a fair distribution of products in short supply. Id. Starting in
April, 1942, the OPA began a list of price ceilings that would eventually extend to eight mil-
lion items. The OPA was absorbed into the Office for Emergency Management on June 1,
1947. Exec. Order No. 9809, 3 C.F.R. 591 (1943-1948), repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80
Stat. 632, 651 (Sept. 6, 1966).
151. See, eg., McGhee Upholstery Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 1455 (1953).
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the stock at a reduced price.152 In turn, after receiving the goods, the
shareholder would sell the stock and incur a loss that it would then in-
clude as part of the true cost of acquiring the goods, thereby effectively
treating the loss as an ordinary loss derived from the sale of a non-capital
asset.153 Accordingly, the Commissioner would object to such treat-
ment, claiming simply that stock in a corporation was a capital asset." 4
The courts that decided these cases followed a different line of rea-
soning than the court in Logan & Kanawha Coal Co. Indeed, instead of
examining the exclusions from the definition of capital assets to deter-
mine whether any applied, the courts performed a substance over form
analysis: If the taxpayer could prove that the purchase of the stock was
only incidental to the acquisition of the merchandise, the court would
allow the taxpayer to treat the losses as part of the cost of goods sold. 155
Therefore, the focus was on the taxpayer's motive for purchasing and
holding the stock rather than its mere purchase and possession. In most
of these World War II period cases, the taxpayer's motive was presumed
to be "inventory acquisition" if the taxpayer disposed of the stock shortly
after acquiring the inventory. 6
One of the most unique methods developed by a supplier is illus-
trated by Western Wine & Liquor Co. v. Commissioner.1 57 In Western
Wine, the taxpayer was a liquor retailer who found it difficult to obtain
152. See, eg., Win. M. Young Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 863 (1952); Hoff-
man Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCII) 579 (1952).
153. See, eg., McGhee Upholstery Co., 12 T.C.M. (CCII) at 1455.
154. See, eg., Edwards v. Hogg, 214 F.2d 640, 643 (5th Cir. 1954).
155. For example, in Hoffman Lumber Co., 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 579, the court stated:
In the instant case the evidence leaves no room for doubt that the overpayments were
part of the costs of the lumber... purchased by [the taxpayer]. While [the taxpayer]
went through the formality of subscribing for shares of [the supplier] in purchasing
lumber, it never became a bona fide stockholder of that company and never intended
to do so. The stock purchase transaction was an obvious sham to circumvent the
O.P.A. regulations.
Id. at 580; see also Wm. M, Young Co., 11 T.C.M. (CCH) at 865 (stating that amounts paid
"nominally for stock were in fact payments for lumber and as such constituted a part of the
cost of goods sold"). But see McGhee Upholstery Co., 12 T.C.M. (CCII) at 1456 ("The record
is entirely too meager on which to conclude that the transaction that [the taxpayer] had with
[the supplier] was other than what it purported to be, the purchase and sale of shares of stock,
and the loss that was suffered by [the taxpayer] must be treated as a long-term capital loss.").
156. See, eg., McGhee Upholstery Co., 12 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1456; Win. M. Young Co., 11
T.C.M. (CCH) at 865 ("The evidence is clear, we think, that the payments were solely for the
purchase of lumber we have so found.").
157. 18 T.C. 1090 (1952); see also Hogg v. Allen, 105 F. Supp. 12 (M.D. Ga. 1952) (tax-
payer bought stock in whiskey wholesaler for procurement rights attached to stock), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Edwards v. Hogg, 214 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1954); Flom v. Hoffer-
bert, 56-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 1 9236 (D. Md. 1955) (taxpayer purchased stock of liquor
company pursuant to plan where he received options to purchase company's liquor for resale).
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an adequate supply of whiskey.'58 In order to meet its needs, the tax-
payer took advantage of a unique stock offering made by one of its princi-
pal suppliers, American Distilling Company (American), which provided
that holders of its stock would be entitled to purchase a proportional
share of the company's inventory at a predetermined price.15 9 The plan
required that the taxpayer buy shares of stock in American and then
notify the company of its intention to exercise the inventory purchase
rights by tendering its shares of stock."6 American would then ship the
whiskey along with the taxpayer's shares, which would be stamped to
indicate that the inventory purchase rights had already been exercised.
161
The stock would then be sold at a substantial loss. 162 The taxpayer en-
gaged in several of these transactions and included the resulting losses in
its calculation of cost of goods sold.'6 3
Applying a substance over form analysis,"6 the Tax Court deter-
mined that the taxpayer's sole motivation for purchasing the company's
stock was to acquire inventory and that the purchase of the American
shares was only a necessary expedient. The court stated:
We think this taxpayer acquired the Distilling stock incident to
the conduct of its business and not for investment and that it
held the stock only long enough to acquire the whiskey and
then sold it to reduce the cost of the whiskey as much as possi-
ble. In the circumstances and as contended by the taxpayer,
the sale of the securities became an incident of the business. 165
Accordingly, the court held that the loss was properly included in the
taxpayer's cost of goods sold.
1 66
The cases that followed the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner 167 took the source of supply
analysis one step further, though most bore little factual resemblance to
their predecessors. Indeed, unlike the incidental stock purchases in
Western Wine, the taxpayers in these later cases held the stock for ex-
tended periods and became active managers in the companies in order to
158. 18 T.C. at 1090.
159. Id. at 1093-94.
160. Id. at 1093.
161. Id. at 1092-93.
162. Id. at 1095-96.
163. Id. at 1096.
164. See 1 BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 26, 14.3.3, at 4-35 to 4-44 for a discussion of a
substance over form analysis.
165. Western Wine, 18 T.C. at 1099.
166. Id.
167. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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guarantee an adequate inventory supply.' 68 The one fact that remained
constant, however, was the taxpayer's attempt to treat a subsequent loss
on the sale of the stock as ordinary. Armed with the expansive reasoning
of Corn Products, taxpayers were often successful.1 69 Two Court of
Claims cases, Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States '7 0 and FS Services,
Inc. v. United States, 7 ' are representative of this trend.
Booth Newspapers involved two newspaper publishers who were
faced with a severe shortage of newsprint just after the end of World War
II.172 Initially, the publishers tried to meet their needs by buying news-
print on the spot market, often at double the normal price. 173 Seeking a
more economical alternative, in 1947 the publishers purchased all of the
outstanding stock of the Michigan Paper Company. 74 Although at the
time of purchase the company only manufactured high quality writing
and book paper, the taxpayers had been assured that the equipment
could be modified to manufacture newsprint.175 Only a part of the ma-
chinery was converted, however, because the taxpayers believed that the
continued production of the other products would keep the company at-
tractive for resale once the newsprint shortage had ended.1 76 By 1954,
the taxpayers were satisfied that the shortage had abated and sold their
shares of stock in the company at a price far below their original
purchase price, deducting the full amount of the loss as an ordinary de-
duction.'7 7 The Commissioner disallowed the deduction on the ground
that the losses sustained were capital in nature.' 78 The taxpayers paid
the deficiencies, sought a refund and, after receiving no satisfaction, peti-
tioned the Court of Claims.' 79
168. See, e.g., Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. CI. 1971); FS Servs., Inc.
v. United States, 413 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (per curiam); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United
States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Journal Co. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Wis.
1961); Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1026 (1960); Livesley v. Commis-
sioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCII) 133 (1960). But see Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F.
Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1958).
169. See, e.g., FS Servys, 413 F.2d at 555; Booth Newspapers, 303 F.2d at 922; Journal Co.,
195 F. Supp. at 440; Electrical Fittings, 33 T.C. at 1032; Livesley, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 140.
170. 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. C1. 1962).
171. 413 F.2d 548 (Ct. C1. 1969).
172. 303 F.2d at 917.
173. Iai
174. Id. at 918.
175. Id.
176. Id. For this reason, the taxpayers did not take any dividends, choosing instead to
reinvest their profits by replacing faulty and aging equipment. Id. at 919.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. Beginning on October 1, 1982, the Court of Claims was thereafter referred to as
the Claims Court. Gen. Order'No. 1, 1 CI. Ct. XXI (1983).
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The Court of Claims began by explaining that although the shares of
stock held by the taxpayers fell within the literal definition of capital
assets, a more flexible approach to the concept of capital assets had devel-
oped.18 According to the court, this flexible approach required an ex-
amination of "the circumstances of the transaction [which include]...
its factual background, the necessities of the particular business involved,
and the intentions of the taxpayer, both at the time the securities were
originally purchased and at the time they were disposed of."' 81 Examin-
ing the record, the court stated that "rather than characterizing the
transaction as a mere purchase of plant and equipment, it seems more
accurate to characterize it as the acquisition of a vital source of inven-
tory."'182 Accordingly, the court concluded that the acquired stock was
not a capital asset because the publishers were motivated to purchase the
company "solely as a temporary expedient to insure an adequate inven-
tory of newsprint during the period of shortage."' 83
FS Services, Inc. v. United States 184 provides another good example
of this approach to the source of supply scenario. The taxpayer in FS
Services was a wholesaler of feeds, fertilizers and petroleum products to
farm cooperatives. 85 Like the taxpayers in Booth Newspapers, the tax-
payer, FS Services, was having a difficult time maintaining an adequate
supply of products because a post-war shortage had developed.' 86 Seeing
no reasonable alternative, the taxpayer purchased all the shares of stock
of a small refinery. 8' Thereafter, even though the shortage subsided
within one year, it would take substantial capital infusions and more than
six years before the taxpayer could resell the stock.'88 The sale of the
stock resulted in a loss of more than seven hundred thousand dollars,
which the taxpayer took as an ordinary deduction. 89 Not surprisingly,
180. Booth Newspapers, 303 F.2d at 920.
181. Id. at 921.
182. Id. at 922.
183. Id. Even though a clear nexus existed between the taxpayer's inventory and its stock
acquisition, the court did not engage in any dialogue regarding the inventory exclusion. Yet,
the Claims Court later cited Booth Newspapers as an example of the scope of the inventory
exclusion. See Circle K Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 665, 672 (1991).
184. 413 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
185. Id. at 549. The petroleum products accounted for approximately 60% of the tax-
payer's annual sales. Id.
186. Id. Some of the products were unavailable in the open market, while others were only
available at prices so inflated that the taxpayer could not pass them on to its customers. Id.
187. Id. at 550. The taxpayer also joined with several other wholesalers in purchasing the
stock of additional refineries. Id
188. Id at 551-52.
189. Id. at 552.
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the Commissioner disallowed the deduction, 190 and the Court of Claims
reviewed the case on appeal.
As in Booth Newspapers, the court used the "flexible method" analy-
sis, looking to the taxpayer's motivation in acquiring and holding the
subject property.1 91 The court considered the following factors in decid-
ing that the stock was not a capital asset: (1) the taxpayer's lack of stock
holdings in other companies; (2) the unattractiveness of the investment;
(3) the taxpayer's intent not to hold on to the stock any longer than
necessary; (4) the lack of available alternatives; (5) the actual use by the
taxpayer of the source of supply; and (6) the sale of stock at the earliest
reasonable opportunity.1 92 Clearly, a more defined standard was neces-
sary, and once again the Supreme Court stepped in. 193 Interestingly, it
would not be a source of supply case that would necessitate the Supreme
Court's revisiting the definition of capital asset; rather, it was the ever
expanding reach of the Corn Products doctrine into fact situations having
absolutely no relation whatsoever to hedging transactions or guarantee-
ing a source of supply of inventory.
IV. THE RETURN To THE INVENTORY EXCLUSION
A. Arkansas Best Rewrites Corn Products and Defines an Exclusion
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner 194 was not an inventory
case,195 yet the Supreme Court examined the scope of the inventory ex-
190. Id. at 548.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 554-55.
193. See Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
194. 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
195. Arkansas Best Corp. was a holding company that in 1968 acquired 65% of the stock of
a Dallas bank. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640, 643 (1984), rev'd in part,
aff'd in part, 800 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). In 1972 the bank
developed problems when the Dallas real estate market collapsed. Id. at 647. Consequently,
significant capital infusions were necessary to avoid failure. Id. at 648. Arkansas Best pro-
vided this capital in return for additional shares of stock believing that a failure to do so would
tarnish its reputation and jeopardize its ability to secure financing in the future. Id. In 1975
the holding company divested itself of most of the bank's stock, incurring a loss of almost ten
million dollars, which it took as an ordinary deduction in its federal income tax return. Id. at
650. Thereafter, the Commissioner denied the deduction, claiming that the loss resulted from
the sale of a capital asset and was only deductible to the extent of capital gains. Arkansas Best
Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215, 217 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). The
Tax Court determined that the stock representing the initial 65% interest was capital in nature
and that the stock representing the taxpayer's effort to protect its business reputation was
ordinary in nature. Arkansas Best, 83 T.C. at 655, 660. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit adopted
a literal reading of I.R.C. § 1221 and found that all of the stock held by the taxpayer was a
capital asset because it did not fall within any of the listed exclusions. Arkansas Best, 800 F.2d
at 218. The Supreme Court affirmed. Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 223.
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clusion, employing the case as a vehicle to rewrite its decision in Corn
Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner.1 96 For over three decades, courts
and commentators assumed that the Corn Products decision had un-
equivocally affirmed the existence of an extra-statutory business excep-
tion to the definition of capital assets.197 In Arkansas Best, however, the
Supreme Court expressly rejected any possibility that such an extra-
statutory exception ever existed and stated that its earlier decision had
been based solely on the inventory exclusion.1 98 Authoring the opinion
for a unanimous Court,1 99 Justice Marshall explained:
The Court in Corn Products proffered the oft-quoted rule of
construction that the definition of "capital asset"' must be nar-
rowly applied and its exclusions interpreted broadly, but it did
not state explicitly whether the holding was based on a narrow
reading of the phrase "property held by the taxpayer," or on a
broad reading of the inventory exclusion of § 1221. In light of
the stark language of § 1221, however, we believe that Corn
Products is properly interpreted as involving an application of
§ 1221's inventory exception.2"
After justifying its assertion that the Corn Products decision was
based solely on an inventory exclusion analysis, the Court in Arkansas
Best nevertheless neglected to delineate how such an analysis should be
conducted in the future.20 1 The Court merely stated it believed the in-
ventory exclusion should be interpreted broadly and that the futures
contracts held by the taxpayer in Corn Products fit within that interpreta-
tion.20 Apparently then, all that is necessary is a determination of
whether the property held by the taxpayer was an "integral part of the
taxpayer's business inventory-purchase system. '203 This would be deter-
mined through an examination of the taxpayer's motive.'
The Court opined that the relevance of the issue of motive had been
misunderstood; specifically, Justice Marshall averred that motive is irrel-
evant for purposes of determining whether property is a capital asset, but
196. 340 U.S. 46 (1955).
197. See supra notes 73, 75 and part III.B.
198. 485 U.S. at 220. For a complete description of the Arkansas Best decision, see
Kleinbard & Greenberg, supra note 66, at 414-19; O'Neill, supra note 73, at 1487-90; and
Reichel, supra note 73, at 840-43.
199. Arkansas Best was decided unanimously, 8-0; Justice Kennedy did not participate in
the consideration or decision of the case. Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 223.
200. Id. at 220.
201. See id
202. Id at 221.
203. Id.
204. Id at 220-23.
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it is relevant in determining whether one of the exclusions applies.20 5 Re-
ferring to the facts in Corn Products, Justice Marshall illustrated this
point by stating:
The close connection between the futures transactions and the
taxpayer's business in Corn Products was crucial to whether the
corn futures could be considered surrogates for the stored in-
ventory of raw corn. For if the futures dealings were not part
of the company's inventory purchase system, and instead
amounted simply to speculation in corn futures, they could not
be considered substitutes for the company's corn inventory, and
would fall outside even a broad reading of the inventory
exclusion.206
The Supreme Court's opinion in Arkansas Best left many questions
unanswered. For example, what types of property could be considered
"an integral part of the taxpayer's inventory purchase-system"-any
property, or just nonspeculative futures? The latter would certainly be
too narrow a reading of a broad exclusion. Furthermore, how would the
Court handle a taxpayer that could not protect itself against price fluctu-
ations or supply shortages by investing in futures contracts? In other
words, what about the "source of supply" doctrine? Thus, that a case
like Circle K Corp. v. United States20 7 would come along was not just
predictable, it was certain.
B. Circle K Tests a Definition
Circle K 20 1 is the first post-Arkansas Best decision to test the param-
eters of the Supreme Court's standard for determining the applicability
of the inventory exclusion. The Claims Court's decision revealed that
the standard is unworkable. Circle K Corporation operates a chain of
over twelve hundred convenience stores.20 9 Well over half of its stores
include self-service gasoline facilities, which report overall sales forty
205. Id. at 223.
206. Id. at 221-22.
207. 23 Cl. Ct. 665 (1991).
208. The decision in Circle K was issued in three separate orders. The first order, issued on
May 16, 1991, was in favor of the taxpayer. See Circle K Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct.
659, 665 (1991). On June 5, 1991, the court directed the clerk to vacate the judgment because
the amount due the taxpayer had been miscalculated and all issues had not been decided. Id.
at 660. On August 2, 1991, the court issued another order reinstating a modified version of its
May 16 order and denied the government's motion for reconsideration. Id. at 660, 665. On
the same day, the court also denied the government's motion for partial summary judgment.
Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 673.
209. Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 666.
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percent in excess of those without such facilities.2 1 ° Because of the im-
portance of gasoline sales to its earnings, the taxpayer wanted to avert
any extended interruption in its supply of gasoline.211 During the 1960s
and 1970s, the taxpayer had tried various methods of securing a steady
source of supply, including efforts to obtain a long-term contract or
purchase a refinery, to no avail.212
In 1980 the taxpayer took a different approach by acquiring 12.3%
of NuCorp Energy, Inc. (NuCorp), an oil and gas exploration and devel-
opment company that owned both oil and gas producing reserves.213 In
addition to acquiring the stock, the taxpayer entered into both an explo-
ration/development agreement and a consulting/training agreement with
NuCorp.2 14 The exploration and development agreement entitled the
taxpayer to a ten percent share in any oil produced, which the taxpayer
could take in kind.2 15 In 1981, in return for 376,000 additional shares
and an option to purchase crude oil from NuCorp, the taxpayer relin-
quished its rights under the exploration and development agreement un-
til January 2, 1983.216 Nevertheless, the taxpayer never exercised the
option.217
NuCorp generated large losses during the period the taxpayer held
its stock and, in 1982, NuCorp filed for Chapter 11218 protection.
219
Shortly thereafter, the taxpayer sold its NuCorp stock, incurring a loss in
excess of twenty-seven million dollars, which it claimed on its federal
income tax return as an ordinary deduction. 220 The Commissioner deter-
mined that the loss was capital and thus only allowed the taxpayer to use
it to offset its capital gains. 221 The taxpayer paid the resulting deficiency,
filed a claim for a refund, which was subsequently denied, and then
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 666-67.
214. Id. at 666.
215. Id. at 667.
216. Id. at 668. The taxpayer could have exercised this option twice a year by designating
from which wells it wanted to purchase the oil.' Id Moreover, as long as that well's produc-
tion was not already committed to a third party, the taxpayer could purchase the oil at market
price for a period running from the exercise date of the option through December of 1988. Id
217. Id at 668-69.
218. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988). Chapter 11 provides for business reorganization under
the supervision of the bankruptcy court with the debtor company normally permitted to con-
tinue operations. Id.
219. Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 669.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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sought relief in the Claims Court.22 2 On a motion for summary judg-
ment, the court determined that the shares of NuCorp stock held by the
taxpayer were not capital assets.22 3 In so holding, the Claims Court used
a source of supply analysis it believed came within the standard for deter-
mining the inventory exclusion's applicability established by the Supreme
Court in Arkansas Best.2 24 In assessing the validity of the analysis em-
ployed, Judge Tidwell, who decided sua sponte the motion for summary
judgment in the taxpayer's favor, stated that the Arkansas Best decision
did not specifically address the source of supply doctrine and that
in the absence of any definite indication to the contrary, the
court feels that a source of supply analysis ... still is valid.
Therefore, the court finds that a source of supply stock
purchase may qualify as a hedging transaction if it is an integral
part of plaintiff's inventory-purchase system.2 25
Essentially, the court stated that as long as the taxpayer was attempting
to protect itself against inventory price fluctuations or was trying to en-
sure a continuous and adequate source of supply, the type of property
used by the taxpayer to achieve this result should not matter. In other
words, stock should not be treated any differently than futures contracts,
as long as the taxpayer can demonstrate that the property was held for
the same purpose, namely, as an integral part of the taxpayer's inventory
purchase system.226 Moreover, the Circle K court averred that a broad
reading of the inventory exclusion should not be available only to taxpay-
ers who can hedge against inventory shortages on a commodities mar-
ket.227 For better or for worse, this is the effect of the standard
announced by the Supreme Court in Arkansas Best. Thus, the Arkansas
Best Court may have closed the door on a taxpayer's argument that
property held for a business purpose was not capital, but it opened the
door to a taxpayer's argument that property held for an inventory pur-
pose was not capital.
The Claims Court erred, however, in its method of determining
whether the stock held by Circle K was an integral part of the taxpayer's
inventory purchase system. Judge Tidwell proclaimed that according to
Arkansas Best, evidence of motive or intent is irrelevant.228 Instead, the
Claims Court stated that resolution of the issue depended on whether the
222. Id
223. Id at 673.
224. Circle K, 23 C1. Ct. at 664.
225. Id at 672.
226. See Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 221.
227. See Circle K, 23 C1. Ct. at 672.
228. Id
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stock purchase, "solely on its face, had a substantially close connection
to [the taxpayer's] business so that it fairly can be characterized as an
integral part of [the taxpayer's] inventory-purchase system."229
Judge Tidwell's understanding of the relevance of motive according
to Arkansas Best is misguided. Merely demonstrating a close connection
between the property held, such as stock in an oil company, and the
inventory needs of the taxpayer, such as oil products, is not enough. The
Court in Arkansas Best did not state that motive was irrelevant. On the
contrary, the Court explicitly deemed motive essential in determining
whether any of the specifically enumerated exclusions to capital assets
apply.230 A mere showing that property, solely on its face, has a close
connection to a taxpayer's inventory would provide a much broader ex-
clusion than that set forth in Arkansas Best. Corn futures have a close
connection to the business of corn products, yet the Supreme Court in
Arkansas Best stated that even with this close connection, such futures
would not come within the inventory exclusion if entered into for specu-
lative purposes.231 The only way to accurately assess whether a taxpayer
holds stock in another company for inventory purposes is to examine
motive.
Because the Claims Court foreclosed motive as a basis for determin-
ing the applicability of the inventory exclusion, the remainder of the
opinion is strained.23 z If, however, the court had examined the tax-
payer's motive, using the pre-Arkansas Best source of supply cases as a
229. Id.
230. See Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 221.
231. See id. at 222.
232. It appears the court concluded that the inventory exclusion was applicable because the
shares represented an interest in an energy company and the taxpayer held an option to
purchase crude oil from that company. See Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 673. Indeed, in rendering
its decision, the Claims Court stated: "In light of the special place that gasoline held in terms
of [the taxpayer's] earnings and profitability, the court feels that [the taxpayer's] investment in
NuCorp bore the legally requisite 'close connection' with its business to warrant application of
the inventory exception." Id. With respect to the failure of the taxpayer to ever exercise its
option, the court continued: "[The taxpayer] should not have to forfeit this interpretation
simply because the supply of gasoline never reached a point where [the taxpayer] needed to
exercise its options." Id.
Furthermore, the court seemed indifferent to the fact that the taxpayer's option was to
acquire crude oil and not gasoline. The court stated:
Obviously [the taxpayer] could not sell NuCorp's crude oil at its retail convenience
stores without refinement into gasoline but, as [the taxpayer] explained, NuCorp's
crude oil could be a substitute for a supply of gasoline because of the practice in the
energy field of trading product. Through this practice, crude oil produced in one
section of the country can be exchanged for refined gasoline at distant and diverse
locations. Had the oil crisis worsened, product trading would have become an im-
portant part of [the taxpayer's] inventory purchase program.
Id. at 668.
January 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
guide, it is doubtful that Circle K would have prevailed. Unlike the tax-
payers in both Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States 233 and FS Serv-
ices, Inc. v. United States,234 an acquisition of a source of supply was not
the primary intent of Circle K.235 Instead, the corporation repeatedly
asserted that its investment in NuCorp was primarily intended to diver-
sify the company and not to guarantee access to an ample supply of in-
ventory.236 NuCorp's expression that its stock might someday be used to
acquire gasoline was, at most, an afterthought.2 37 Consequently, it is dif-
ficult to imagine that Circle K presents a successful source of supply ar-
gument under the Corn Products doctrine, let alone under the standard
set forth in Arkansas Best.
It was inevitable that an opinion like Circle K would follow Arkan-
sas Best. In fact, anomalous decisions will continue to find their way into
casebooks as long as the judiciary is convinced that a broad reading of
the inventory exclusion under § 1221(1) is required. One must question,
however, whether Congress envisioned such an expansive reading of the
exclusion. A review of the legislative history of the inventory exclusion
and an examination of subsequent amendments to the definition of capi-
tal assets suggest otherwise.
V. DETERMINING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
It is difficult to discern Congress's true intent when it formulated the
definition of capital assets in the Revenue Act of 1921 because the legisla-
tive history regarding that section of the Act is scant at best.238 The
committee reports cite only a desire to provide relief to farmers and other
long-term holders of property from the bunching effect. 239 There are no
statements as to why Congress employed the language it did or chose the
exclusions it created. Indeed, the only mention of inventory in the 1921
Act is in the statute itself. Congress simply excluded from capital assets,
233. 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
234. 413 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
235. See Circle K, 23 Cl. Ct. at 667-68.
236. On December 15, 1980, the taxpayer filed a proxy statement and prospectus with the
Securities and Exchange Commission detailing a plan of reorganization designed to allow the
company greater flexibility in its diversification efforts. Id. at 667. The taxpayer identified the
gas and oil business as the first industry targeted in its diversification efforts and stated that it
had invested in NuCorp for that reason. Id
237. The court, however, stressed the fact that the taxpayer always had qualified its diversi-
fication statements by adding "that its plans were subject to change depending on the availabil-
ity of gasoline." Id at 668.
238. See H.R. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1921).
239. S. REp. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1921). For a discussion of the bunching
effect, see 1 BrriKaR & LOKKEN, supra note 26, 3.5.7, at 3-65 to 3-66.
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stock in trade or other "property of a kind which would properly be
included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year." 2" It is this original language to which the Supreme Court
ascribes its broad reading.241 Congress, however, did not state whether
such words should be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Subsequent
amendments to the definition of capital assets, however, do provide in-
sight into the actual meaning of these twenty-five words and reveal a
much narrower exclusion than that set forth in Arkansas Best.242
In its history, the inventory exclusion has only been amended twice.
The Revenue Act of 1924 added to the existing words of "stock in trade
or other property of a kind properly includable in inventory if on hand at
the close of the taxable year," the words, "or property held primarily for
sale by taxpayer in the ordinary course of his trade or business."'2 4 3 The
Revenue Act of 1934 modified this amendment to read "or property held
by taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business.'"244 Certainly, the added language would be unneces-
sary if, as claimed by the Supreme Court in Arkansas Best, the original
twenty-five words were meant to be broadly interpreted.
This language cannot stand for the proposition professed by the
Supreme Court. On the contrary, the legislative history of the amend-
ments discloses that Congress added the amendments because it was con-
cerned that the existing exclusion was actually too narrow and needed
expansion. Indeed, Representative Green of Iowa, who proposed the
1924 amendment, stated:
[T]he object.., was to expand a little further the words "stock
in trade," as they might possibly be construed to mean just the
stock that the merchant or other party happened to hold in his
business house at the time, the idea of the committee being that
the definition of "capital assets" should exclude not only what
was in the business house at the time but goods in the process
of manufacture and other articles that eventually would be-
240. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 232 (emphasis added).
241. In Arkansas Best, the Court, discussing its earlier opinion in Corn Products, stated:
[A]lIthough corn futures were not "actual inventory," their use as an integral part of
the taxpayer's inventory-purchase system led the Court to treat them as substitutes
for the corn inventory such that they came within a broad reading of "property of a
kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayers" in § 1221.
485 U.S. at 221.
242. See, eg., Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(a)(8), 43 Stat. 253, 263; Revenue Act of
1934, ch. 277, § 117(b), 48 Stat. 680, 714.
243. Revenue Act of 1924 § 208(a)(8).
244. Revenue Act of 1934 § 117(b) (emphasis added).
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come a part of the stock and were held for that purpose and,
therefore, would have to be included in the inventory.245
Thus, the words "or property held for sale to customers in the ordinary
course" must denote the outer boundary of § 1221(1).246
The meaning of the original twenty-five words is found in the Senate
Finance Committee Report to the Revenue Act of 1924.247 Reiterating
the need to expand the original language, the report states that the
amendment was necessary to show that property held for resale "was not
a capital asset whether or not it is the type of property which under good
accounting practice would be included in inventory." '248 Implicitly then,
Congress was saying that the words upon which the Court in Arkansas
Best would later rely, extended only to property that the taxpayer's ac-
counting practice required to be included in inventory if on hand at the
close of the tax year. The added language was necessary to cover prop-
erty that, although not of a type includable in the taxpayer's year-end
inventory, the taxpayer nevertheless held for resale.24 9 Essentially, Con-
gress was saying that goods held for resale might not be includable in
year-end inventory for financial accounting purposes, but they do consti-
tute property within the scope of the inventory exclusion.
Congressional recognition of this dichotomy helps to explain the ac-
tions of the Commissioner in General Counsel Memorandum 17,322. As
previously discussed, the question addressed by the Commissioner in
General Counsel Memorandum 17,322 was whether the same type of
property-a futures contract-held by two different taxpayers-a cotton
dealer and a textile manufacturer-had a different character in the hands
of each taxpayer because one taxpayer included the property in inventory
at year-end while the other did not.250 At least in the situation in which
both taxpayers held the property for the same purpose-to protect
against inventory price fluctuation-the Commissioner found that the
property had the same character and decided to disregard the taxpayer's
accounting method in determining the applicability of the exclusion.
The addition of other business asset exclusions to the definition of
capital assets further supports this narrow reading. In 1938 Congress
added the predecessor of § 1221(2) by excluding depreciable trade or
245. 65 CONG. REc. H2842 (1924) (statement of Rep. Green); SEIDMAN, supra note 34, at
717.
246. For an in depth discussion of the judicial treatment of this phrase, see 2 BI=KER &
LOKKEN, supra note 26, % 51.2.
247. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1924).
248. Id (emphasis added).
249. Id
250. See supra notes 66-87 and accompanying text.
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business property from the capital asset category.251 The scope of this
exclusion was extended in 1942 to include real property used in a trade
or business.252 Further, in 1954 Congress added § 1221(4), which ex-
cluded accounts and notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of
business.25 3 By adding these very specific, supplementary business exclu-
sions, a reasonable inference can be drawn that each business exclusion
should not be read to include property beyond the actual property identi-
fied. To do otherwise creates the potential for a particular business asset
to be excluded under more than one provision. For example, a very
broad reading of the inventory exclusion might arguably include storage
facilities such as grain silos for storing corn as "inventory." Yet, this
property is explicitly excluded under § 1221(2) as depreciable trade or
business property. That Congress would have intended such an overlap
is unsupported and highly unlikely.
As a matter of fact, an extremely broad reading of these business
exclusions theoretically could exclude virtually all business property
from the capital asset category. This could be called the reverse Corn
Products doctrine. The United States Supreme Court, however, emphati-
cally rejected any cumulative, illustrative use of the business exclusions,
stating: "These exclusions would be largely superfluous if assets acquired
primarily or exclusively for business purposes were not capital assets.
' 254
Yet, it is difficult to reconcile this statement with the Court's steadfast
belief that the inventory exclusion should be interpreted to include prop-
erty beyond actual inventory.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of determining which assets qualify as capital assets under
§ 1221 has had a long and tortured history. Nowhere has this been more
apparent than with the continued difficulty exhibited by the judiciary
while engaging in futile attempts to define the line between capital assets
and "other property of a kind which would properly be included in the
inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year. 
' 255
In 1988 the United States Supreme Court declared that the inventory
exclusion under § 1221(1) enveloped any and all property that a taxpayer
could prove was an integral part of the taxpayer's inventory purchase
251. See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 117(a)(1), 52 Stat. 447, 500.
252. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 151(a), 56 Stat. 798, 846 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 1221(2) (1988)).
253. See Revenue Act of 1954, ch. 736, § 1221(4), 68A Stat. 3, 322 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 1221(4) (1988)).
254. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 218 (1988).
255. I.R.C. § 1221(1) (1988).
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system. The Claims Court's recent decision in Circle K, announcing the
survival of the source of supply doctrine under the Arkansas Best stan-
dard, confirms that the Supreme Court's standard is unworkable. Cases
like Circle K will continue to pervade the courts as long as the judiciary
continues to adhere stringently to the flawed notion that the exclusions to
the definition of capital assets were meant to be interpreted broadly.
That belief is flawed because a careful review of the legislative history of
the definition of capital assets reveals a congressional intent antithetical
to that which is now becoming deeply entrenched judicial precedent.
Section 1221(1) excludes property that a taxpayer would be required
to include under good accounting practices in inventory if it were on
hand at the end of the taxable year.256 It also excludes any other prop-
erty that a taxpayer holds for resale, even if such property does not fall
within the traditional definition of inventory. Section 1221(1), however,
includes shares of stock held by nonsecurities dealers regardless of the
taxpayer's motive for acquiring and retaining the stock. Therefore, it is
time for Congress or the Supreme Court to espouse a much stricter inter-
pretation of § 1221(1) and bury the source of supply doctrine in the
graveyard of defunct tax doctrines, right alongside the Corn Products
doctrine.
256. Id. § 1221(1).
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